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Ref: CM/2020/12/114

TO: Maj. Gen. Rabi Mujung Emmanuel (ITGoNU)
Maj. Gen. Martin Gama Abucha (SPLM/A-IO)
Maj. Gen. David Nyang Kueth (SSOA)
Maj. Gen. Bior Leek Kuareng (Former Detainees)

FROM: The Chairperson, CTSAMVM

DATE: 14 December 2020

**SUBJECT: CTSAMVM REPORT 2020/13 – TROOP MOVEMENT FROM
NORTHERN BAHR EL GHAZAL STATE TO UPPER NILE STATE**

Dear CTSAMVM Technical Committee Senior Party Representatives,

Please find attached a report on SPDF troop movements from Northern Bahr el Ghazal State to Upper Nile State on 19 and 20 November 2020.

Please accept the assurances of my highest consideration.

Major General Tensome Gemechu Adene

Chairperson

**Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification
Mechanism**



CTSAMVM REPORT 2020/13

TROOP MOVEMENT FROM NORTHERN BAHR EL GHAZAL STATE TO UPPER NILE STATE

Introduction

1. Allegation:

- a. On 21 November 2020 CTSAMVM received an allegation from Maj Gen Goanar, the commander of SPLM/A-IO Division 5, that on 19 and 20 November 2020 the SSPDF moved approximately 100 heavily armed soldiers from 3rd Division in Northern Bahr el Ghazal State to Paloich in Upper Nile State.
- b. CTSAMVM had received no notification of this alleged movement from the SSPDF.

2. Aim: The aim of this report is to detail the findings of CTSAMVM investigations into this allegation, attribute responsibility for breaches of the R-ARCSS where applicable and to make recommendations.

3. Methodology:

- a. On 24 November 2020 CTSAMVM visited 3 Division SSPDF at Wunyik. The Divisional Commander was away, but they met the Deputy Divisional Commander Maj Gen James Akoch.
- b. On 1 December 2020 CTSAMVM visited 3rd Division SSPDF HQ again and this time were able to meet the Divisional Commander, Maj Gen Bak Akook Bak, together with his senior staff officers.

Findings

4. During the visit to 3 Division SSPDF on 24 November 2020 the Deputy Divisional Commander stated that:

- a. The troop movement consisted of 80 soldiers, not 100.
 - b. It was the result of a bi-lateral agreement between Sudan and South Sudan aimed at strengthening common border security.
 - c. The order for the movement came from the “strategic level”.
 - d. The Deputy Commander observed that flanking units had not been informed of the movement, and that this was an oversight by the higher level of command. He also said that they (3rd Division) assumed CTSAMVM would have been informed by higher command.
5. During the visit to 3rd Division SSPDF, the Divisional Commander confirmed what had been said by the Deputy Commander. He went on to state that:
- a. The SSPDF did not intentionally breach the R-ARCSS.
 - b. In future he would ensure that CTSAMVM was informed of all movements as required by the R-ARCSS.
6. Movement from Bentiu: On 30 November 2020 CTSAMVM was made aware of another movement of a similar number of SSPDF troops by air from 4th Division in Bentiu. The CTSAMVM SSPDF Senior National Liaison Officer confirmed that this was part of the same plan to manage the Sudanese border which involved troops contributions from 3rd, 4th and 5th Divisions. CTSAMVM was not informed of this movement.

Assessment

7. There is nothing to suggest that this troop movement constituted a deliberate violation of the R-ARCSS. However, by failing to inform CTSAMVM on the movement, the SSPDF was in clear breach of the R-ARCSS.

Conclusion

8. It is the conclusion of CTSAMVM by moving troops from Wunyiik to Paloich on 20 and 21 November 2020 and from other areas as part of the same deployment, the SSPDF failed to comply with the R-ARCSS specifically Article 2.1.10.4: (prohibited actions) “.....redeployment and movement of forces , except for administrative and logistical movements allowed under COHA of 21 December 2017, which will be reported to CTSAMVM prior to movements.....”

Observations and Recommendations

9. There is no evidence to suggest that this troop movement was anything to do with the conflict between the Parties to the R-ARCSS: according to senior SSPDF officers it was a strategic movement to help manage border security with Sudan. However, this movement was made without informing CTSAMVM. It was also made without informing ‘flanking formations’ including those of the SPLM/A-IO.
10. Whether the failure to inform both CTSAMVM and the SPLM/A-IO was the responsibility of JDB or the SSPDF is not clear, however this failure could have led to serious misunderstandings.
11. CTSAMVM recommends:
 - a. That JDB reminds all commanders of their responsibility under the R-ARCSS to inform CTSAMVM of administrative and logistic troop movements.
 - b. That all JDB ensures all Parties and relevant formations are informed of any such movements