Ref: CM/2021/02/057

TO:        Maj. Gen. Rabi Mujung Emmanuel (ITGoNU)  
            Maj. Gen. Martin Gama Abucha (SPLM/A-IO) 
            Maj. Gen. David Nyang Kueth (SSOA)  
            Maj. Gen. Bior Leek Kuareng (Former Detainees)

FROM:        The Chairperson, CTSAMVM

DATE:        23 February 2021

SUBJECT:        CTSAMVM REPORT 2021/2 – VIOLENCE IN THE MOROTO AREA

Dear CTSAMVM Technical Committee Senior Party Representatives,

Please find attached a report on violence in the Moroto area as a result of the change of allegiance by Maj Gen Moses Lokujo Gabriel.

Please accept the assurances of my highest consideration.

[Signature]

Major General Teshome Gemechu Aden
Chairperson
Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring and Verification Mechanism
CTSAMVM REPORT 2021/2 – VIOLENCE IN THE MOROTO AREA

Executive Summary

On 21 September 2020 Maj General Moses Lokujo Gabriel announced his defection from SPLM/A-IO to the SSPDF. After his change of allegiance his forces based in Kirwa were responsible for conducting attacks on the Moroto Training Centre in September and November 2020.

Allegations were made that Maj Gen Moses Lokujo was supported by SSPDF and had been responsible for breaches of the ceasefire.

CTSAMVM conducted investigations into the activities of Maj Gen Moses Lokujo forces from September 2020 until February 2021.

The forces commanded by Maj Gen Moses Lokujo have been accepted by and are under the control of SSPDF. This amounts to mobilisation and recruitment and as such is a prohibited act. Attacks on Moroto Training Centre were carried out by affiliated forces which were under the control of the SSPDF.

In addition, SSPDF has occupied Kirwa village in Central Equatoria which is recorded by CTSAMVM as an area under SPLM/A-IO control following the declaration of forces in October 2018. The SSPDF has also conducted deployments of forces without notifying CTSAMVM as required by the R-ARCSS.

CTSAMVM recommends that; SSPDF remove forces from SPLM/A-IO controlled areas; stops the integration of the forces of Maj Gen Moses Lokujo into the SSPDF and instead his forces should be fast tracked through a DDR process.
Introduction

1. Following the change of allegiance of Maj Gen Moses Lokoju Gabriel (the former commander of SPLMA-IO Division 2B in Kirwa) to the SSPDF, the situation in the Moroto, Ajio and Kirwa areas has become tense and violent. There have been at least two clashes at Moroto Training Centre and allegations by the SPLM/A-IO that the SSPDF have been involved in supporting the SSPDF affiliated forces of Maj Gen Lokoju.

2. Following an initial attack against Moroto Training Centre on 29 September 2020 steps were taken by the Joint Defence Board (JDB) to stop the situation from escalating, and various measures were agreed. However, none of these measures were implemented and tensions continued until further fighting broke out in the area of Moroto Training Centre on 26 November 2020.

3. There have been further clashes notably on 3 January 2021 near Kajo Keji and tension between the parties has been heightened since the deployment of SSPDF forces to Kirwa on 1 January 2021.

4. Allegations:

   a. SPLM/A-IO have made several allegations.

      i. That SSPDF have been supporting the forces of Maj Gen Moses Lokujo.

      ii. That forces loyal to Maj Gen Moses Lokujo are under the command of SSPDF.

      iii. That Maj Gen Moses Lokujo has mobilised and recruited soldiers into the SSPDF.

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1 The village is shown on CTSAMVM Maps as Kirwa but is also referred to as Kerwa in the local area.
iv. That the forces of Maj Gen Moses Lokujo, working under command of SSPDF, have attacked SPLM/A-IO positions at Kirwa, Ajio and Moroto.

v. That SSPDF have deployed forces into areas which prior to the change of allegiance of Maj Gen Moses Lokujo were under SPLM/A-IO control.

b. SSPDF have alleged that SPLM/A-IO forces attacked SSPDF forces on 3 January 2021.

c. UN agencies and NGOs allege that the forces of Maj Gen Moses Lokujo have occupied civilian installations including an IDP camp at Korijo and schools and health facilities in Bori.

5. **Aim:** The aim of this report is to detail the findings of CTSAMVM investigations into this allegation, attribute responsibility for breaches of the R-ARCSS where applicable and to make recommendations.

6. **Methodology:**

   a. CTSAMVM has been conducting patrols to investigate the multiple allegations. Below is a table showing all patrols and engagements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24 Sep 20</td>
<td>Visit to Moroto TC</td>
<td>Meeting with SPLM/A-IO, reports that the security situation is poor since the arrival of Maj Gen Moses Lokujo at Kajo Keji.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>02 Oct 20</td>
<td>Visit to Moroto and Kajo Keji</td>
<td>CTSAMVM Team with JTSC, JMCC representatives to follow up on the attack on Moroto TC reported on 29 Sep 20.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>07 Oct 20</td>
<td>Visit to Kajo Keji, Moroto and Panyume</td>
<td>Minister of Defence, Co-Chair JDB visited the area accompanied by CTSAMVM to address the insecurity issues.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
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<td>------------</td>
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<td>--------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 Nov 20</td>
<td>Visit to Panyume</td>
<td>CTSAMVM team investigation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 Nov 20</td>
<td>Visit to Kajo Keji</td>
<td>CTSAMVM team investigation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>01 Dec 20</td>
<td>Visit to Moroto</td>
<td>CTSAMVM team investigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Feb 21</td>
<td>Visit to Kajo Keji, Kirwa, Koyoki</td>
<td>CTSAMVM team investigation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

b. The evidence in this report is extracted from investigation reports prepared by MVT Yei. The investigation reports were signed by International Observers and National Monitors and discussed with Senior National Liaison Officers.

c. The standard of proof used by the CTSAMVM to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to verify that a Party-Signatory is not in compliance with the provisions of the Agreements is "reasonable grounds to believe that the incident that is the subject of the investigation occurred." This is in accordance with accepted practice for monitoring mechanisms and humanitarian entities and signifies that sufficient facts and evidence have been collected to conclude that an event has occurred.

Findings

7. Declaration of Forces.

a. When parties declared forces of Battalion size and above in November 2018 there were no declared SSPDF forces in the vicinity of Kirwa or Panyume. The map below shows the situation as at 12 November 2018. The numbers on the map relate to recorded locations of military units. The colours indicate the affiliation of the units at those location, the pink dots show SPLM/A-IO, the blue dots show SSPDF. None of the declared positions were contested by either SSPDF or SPLM/A-IO. Pockets of SSPDF troops within the SPLM/A-IO controlled areas of Panyume and Kirwa have never been reported to CTSAMVM. Kirwa is in the pink 145/159 area.
b. On 6 January 2021 CTSAMVM was informed by the SSPDF HQ 2nd Bde Mobile Ground Force at Kajo Keji that a military SSPDF force had been deployed to Kerwa. The presence of SSPDF forces was confirmed by the Commander of the deployed force who at the time was Col John Camillo on 8 January 2021.

c. CTSAMVM visited Kirwa on 6 February 2021 and confirmed that it was occupied by 2nd Battalion 2nd Bde Mobile Ground Force and had been occupied since 1 January 2021.

d. Maj Gen Lokujo stated to CTSAMVM during their visit that he had been in control of the Kirwa area before his change of allegiance in September 2020. In fact, MVT Yei visited Kirwa on 18 July 2018 and confirmed that SPLM/A-IO were occupying the area, at that time the forces were commanded by Brig Gen Moses Lokujo.

8. **Deployment of Forces.** The deployment of forces to Kirwa was not communicated to CTSAMVM in advance as required by Article 2.1.10.4 of the R-ARCSS and article 11.6 of ACOH. During the visit by the Minister of Defence and CDF to Moroto on 7 October 2020 it was stated that a joint SSPDF and SPLM/A-IO force would
be deployed to the Kirwa-Moroto-Aijo area to provide security. The deployment of SSPDF to Kirwa was not a part of a joint force and was not communicated to SPLM/A-IO. The stated purpose of the deployment was to separate Maj Gen Lokujo’s forces from those of SPLM/A-IO.

9. **Occupation of Civilian Buildings.** CTSAMVM visited Kirwa on 6 February 2021 and confirmed that the SSPDF are occupying the health facility and have dug trenches in the vicinity of the facility. CTSAMVM also confirmed that Maj Gen Moses Lokujo and forces are occupying a civilian building in the Kajo-Keji area.

10. **Change of Allegiance.** On 21 September 2020 the SPLM/A-IO published a press statement saying that Maj Gen Moses Lokoju had “defected” to the SSPDF. Subsequently CTSAMVM received a copy of Maj Gen Moses Lokujo’s resignation letter on 21 September 2020. CTSAMVM interviewed Maj Gen Lokujo on 6 February 2021 at Kajo Keji.

a. Maj Gen Lokujo stated that in July 2020 he was summoned to Juba by SPLM/A-IO leadership. On 22 July 2020 he was flown to Juba from Panyume. On that day he travelled on a CTSAMVM aircraft which was scheduled to return from a Joint Field Visit (JFV) to Panyume cantonment site with CTSAMVM staff and CTSAMVM Technical Committee (CTC) representatives. His request to travel was agreed because seats were available and where capacity exists CTSAMVM will assist in movement of party members. On the day he left Panyume Maj Gen Lokujo had no weapons because CTSAMVM does not permit the carriage of weapons on aircraft.

b. On arrival in Juba Maj Gen Lokujo states that he was placed under house arrest in the Panorama Hotel near Juba Airport under the supervision of Brig Gen Bamoth, SPLM/A-IO. He was reportedly detained in the hotel for 47 days before he escaped custody and was driven to Kajo Keji prior to declaring his change of allegiance on 21 September 2020 after which he returned to Juba.
c. Maj Gen Lokujo stated to CTSAMVM that his defection and change of allegiance was endorsed by the SSPDF Commander in Chief and that he was ordered to remain within the area that was previously under his control to await the integration of his forces into the SSPDF. He stated that no additional soldiers or weapons were provided to him by SSPDF but that youths from Greater Equatoria have been joining his forces. He stated that he has no working relationship with 2nd Bde Ground Force but that he received orders from SSPDF HQ in Juba.

d. Maj Gen Lokujo and his forces have been operating in the Kirwa and Kajo-Keji area since September 2020. On 30 October 2020 CTSAMVM were informed by the NSS Director in Yei, Mr. Alak Deng Alak, that Lokujo’s forces were in the Ajio/Kirwa area preparing to be integrated into the SSPDF. Also, on 10 November 2020 CTSAMVM was informed by SSPDF 1st Bde Commander Brig Gen John Lual that Maj Gen Lokujo’s forces were in Kirwa.

e. On 30 November 2020 CTSAMVM met Col Gush Dieng SSPDF, at the time 2nd Bde Mobile Ground Force Deputy Commander at Kajo Keji. He informed CTSAMVM that the Brigade Commander (Brig Gen Lual Deng) had given Maj Gen Lokujo a standing order to undertake no offensive action and that Maj Gen Lokujo occasionally reported to the Brigade. CTSAMVM cannot confirm whether the standing order was in written form or verbal.

f. On 6 February 2021 CTSAMVM interviewed Col John Camillo who at the time was Deputy Commander of HQ 2nd Bde Mobile Ground Force SSPDF in Kajo Keji. He stated that there was no command relationship between his HQ and Maj Gen Lokujo. However, he also stated that he had recently received orders from SSPDF HQ in Juba to relocate Maj Gen Lokujo forces from Kirwa to Kajo Keji which he "executed" on 3 February 2021. Maj Gen Lokujo reported that he was ordered to move from Kirwa to Kajo Keji by SSPDF HQ Juba. Maj Gen Moses Lokujo headquarters is located 500 metres from the SSPDF HQ 2nd Bde Mobile Ground Force at Kajo Keji.
11. Alleged provision of support to the forces of Maj Gen Lokujo:

a. Maj Gen Lokujo had no weapons when he left Panyume. The clashes between his forces and the SPLM/A-IO were sustained and according to witnesses involved the use of heavy weapons and equipment and large scale ammunition expenditure. Maj Gen Lokujo stated to CTSAMVM that he "sustains his forces through his own initiatives". CTSAMVM observed no vehicles in Maj Gen Lokujo's positions in Kajo Keji but SSPDF Mamba type APCs were observed at Kajo-Keji and Kirwa on 6 February 2021.

b. The means by which Maj Gen Lokujo moved his forces from Kirwa to Kajo - Keji is not known but Col John Camillo, Deputy Commander SSPDF HQ 2nd Bde Mobile Ground Force, did state that he "executed the relocation" implying the provision of transport support.

c. The number of soldiers who joined Maj Gen Lokujo when he defected in September 2020 cannot be validated. Based upon witness statements CTSAMVM estimate that Maj Gen Lokujo's forces involved in the recent clashes amount to no more than 100, effectively of infantry company strength. Maj Gen Lokujo stated that he has accepted into his force youth from Greater Equatoria. Witnesses have stated that the youth are armed and have taken part in the recent clashes.

12. Ceasefire Violations:

a. On 27 September 2020 there were clashes between the forces of Maj Gen Moses Lokujo and SPLM/A-IO in the Kirwa and Ajio area. The clashes were confirmed by SPLM/A-IO commanders at Moroto and Panyume and by Maj Gen Moses Lokujo.
b. On 29 September 2020 there were clashes between forces of Maj Gen Moses Lokujo and SPLM/A-IO at Moroto Training Centre. The clashes were confirmed by SPLM/A-IO and Maj Gen Lokujo.

c. On 26 November 2020 the Moroto Training Centre was attacked by forces led by Maj Gen Moses Lokujo. Following the attack, the training centre was vacated and it is no longer operational. Witnesses stated that Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) were employed in the attacks. When CTSAMVM visited on 1 December 2020 there were no visual signs of heavy vehicles having been deployed but this does not mean that such equipment was not used. Witnesses also reported the use of heavy weapons but the type and quantity were not verified. CTSAMVM confirmed the presence of SSPDF Mamba type military vehicles with mounted weapons at Kajo Keji and Kirwa on 6 February 2021 but it is not known if these were the same vehicles reported to have been involved in the clashes. The Mamba type vehicles operated by SSPDF in the area are of the type shown below, photographed by CTSAMVM on 6 February 2021 at Kirwa.
d. On 3 January 2021 SSPDF alleged that one of their patrols was ambushed by SPLM/A-IO while travelling towards Kajo Keji at Katingo. The incident was confirmed by SSPDF and SPLM/A-IO but no casualties were reported.

13. Moroto Training Centre:

a. The Training Centre at Moroto is no longer operational and was evacuated on 26 November 2020. The trainees and instructors were released to stay at home or in a safe area until the situation improves. On 29 November 2020 the Training Centre Commander, SPLM/A-IO Brig Gen Wal Choul, stated that the site would not be opened until joint SSPDF/SPLM/A-IO forces had taken responsibility for security in the area and the SSPDF-affiliated forces of Maj Gen Moses Lokujo had been moved from his present location which at the time was Kirwa.
b. Prior to the attack on Moroto on 26 November 2020 by the forces of Maj Gen Lokujo the Moroto Training Centre was unable to deliver unified training because it was occupied only by SPLM/A-IO and SSOA trainees. The instructors were drawn from all parties. The lack of balance in the centre was identified at the 17th CTSAMVM Board along with a recommendation for the JDB to address the need to ensure all trainees were balanced between SSPDF, SPLM/A-IO, and SSOA as required in the R-ARCSS.

Assessment

14. SSPDF have occupied locations which are registered by CTSAMVM as being under the control of SPLM/A-IO. Assertions that the locations were under the control of Maj Gen Lokujo prior to his defection are not sustainable because the controlling party of the area was acknowledged as being SPLM/A-IO in 2018. Maj Lokujo has declared he is no longer part of the SPLM/A-IO; therefore, the control over the area remains with SPLM/A-IO. The reasons given for occupying Kirwa Gen were to provide a buffer between the forces of Maj Gen Lokujo and SPLM/A-IO; this is not a justification for occupying Kirwa.

15. The forces of Maj Gen Moses Lokujo are occupying civilian infrastructure in Kajo Keji. The forces of SSPDF are occupying a health care facility in Kirwa. Both occupations are now recorded on the CTSAMVM register of occupied buildings.

16. SSPDF moved forces to Kirwa without communicating the intention to CTSAMVM. Also, the movement of Maj Gen Moses Lokujo forces from Kirwa to Kajo Keji was conducted on the order of SSPDF without communicating the intention to CTSAMVM.

17. Maj Gen Moses Lokujo and his forces have been conducting offensive operations in the Moroto area since his defection announced on 21 September 2020. It is clear from the evidence collected that he responds to orders from SSPDF HQ in Juba and SSPDF HQ 2nd Bde Mobile Ground Force at Kajo Keji. On 30 October
2020 CTSAMVM were informed that the forces of Maj Gen Moses Lukojo were in the process of being integrated into SSPDF. On 10 November 2020 his forces were confirmed as being in Kirwa. On 1 January 2021 SSPDF forces occupied Kirwa alongside the forces of Maj Gen Moses Lukojo. On 3 February 21 Maj Gen Lukojo and his forces were relocated to Kajo Keji; in occupying a position only 500 metres from the SSPDF HQ 2nd Bde Mobile Ground Force they are effectively co-located with the SSPDF. It is clear from all the evidence collected that SSPDF have accepted the change of allegiance of Maj Gen Moses Lukojo and that forces which he commands are affiliated to SSPDF whilst undergoing integration. The acceptance of soldiers changing sides means that the SSPDF has increased its strength at the expense of SPLM/A-IO in complete disregard of the ongoing unification of forces.

18. There have been verified incidents of fighting between the forces of Maj Gen Moses Lukojo which are affiliated to SSPDF and the SPLM/A-IO. However, it is not possible to verify the degree to which Maj Gen Moses Lukojo had been integrated at the time of the attacks on SPLM/A-IO on 27 and 29 September 2020. All the evidence in the attack on 26 November 2020 at Moroto indicates that the forces of Maj Gen Lukojo were receiving orders from SSPDF and had begun the process of integration. The only verified incident involving a direct clash between SSSPDF and SPLM/A-IO was on 3 January 2021 which resulted in no casualties and was resolved quickly by commanders on the ground. The clashes between the SSPDF affiliated forces of Maj Gen Lukojo and SPLM/A-IO at Moroto, Kirwa and Andijo were a result of provocative action instigated by Maj Gen Lukojo.

19. CTSAMVM cannot verify the extent to which SSPDF have been supporting the forces of Maj Gen Lukojo during the recent clashes; however, witness statements reveal that protected vehicles and heavy weapons were used in the attack on Moroto Training Centre. It is confirmed that in the Kajo Keji area SSPDF have equipment which matches the descriptions provided by witnesses. It is not possible to confirm whether Maj Gen Lukojo received weapons or ammunition from SSPDF although it is a fact that he was not in possession of any weapons when he left Panyume on 22 July 20. It is not possible to confirm whether SSPDF forces were
used to support the forces of Maj Gen Lukojo. It is confirmed by Maj Gen Lukojo that he has accepted into his force youths from Greater Equatoria.

20. The failure to ensure a balance of forces from all parties in Moroto Training Centre resulted in the trainees from SPLM/A-IO being vulnerable to the armed action carried out by the forces of Maj Gen Lukojo after his defection. Had there been a large-scale presence of SSPDF trainees in the training centre the fighting could have been avoided because it would have been in the best interests of all parties to ensure the security of Moroto.

Conclusions

21. It is the conclusion of CTSAMVM that by occupying Kirwa from 1 January 2021 SSPDF failed to comply with the R-ARCSS, specifically Article 2.1.10.4, and ACOOH, Articles 3.2 and 11.6, which prohibit hostile and provocative actions such as the redeployment and movement of forces.

22. It is the conclusion of CTSAMVM by moving troops from Kajo Keji to Kirwa on 1 January 2021 and moving troops from Kirwa to Kajo Keji on 3 February 2021, the SSPDF failed to comply with the R-ARCSS, specifically Article 2.1.10.4, which provides that Parties are to refrain from prohibited actions such as “redeployment and movement of forces, except for administrative and logistical movements allowed under COHA of 21st December 2017, which will be reported to CTSAMVM prior to movements”.

23. It is the conclusion of CTSAMVM that the occupation of civilian buildings by SSPDF at Kirwa and by the affiliated forces of Maj Gen Lukojo at Kajo Keji represents a failure by SSPDF to implement Article 2.2.3.1 “that civilian areas will be immediately demilitarised”.

24. It is the conclusion of CTSAMVM that the acceptance of those forces of Maj Gen Lukojo as well as the armed youth that he has mobilised indicates the SSPDF has
failed to implement Article 2.1.10.4: (prohibited actions) recruitment and mobilisation.

25. It is the conclusion of CTSAMVM that it is not possible to confirm the extent to which SSPDF have provided support to the forces of Maj Gen Lokujo; however, the reports of the involvement of Mamba-type APCs during the attack on Moroto are credible and the only source of such equipment in the area is SSPDF. Furthermore, it is difficult to envisage how SSPDF could have "executed the relocation" of Maj Gen Lokujo forces from Kirwa to Kajo Keji without providing transport support.

26. It is the conclusion that the JDB/JTSC inability to achieve a balance of forces in Moroto Training Centre contributed to the poor security in the area following the defection of Maj Gen Lokujo.

Observations and Recommendations

27. CTSAMVM recommends:

- That SSPDF withdraw forces from Kirwa.

- That the integration of the forces of Maj Gen Lokujo into SSPDF is stopped and instead his forces are quickly put through a DDR process.

- That JDB decide the long-term future of Moroto Training Centre and either ensure there is an equitable balance between trainees from all parties or close the centre permanently.

- That the issue of Changes of Allegiance is addressed at the political level by IGAD and R-JMEC.

- That all parties fully commit to the processes which will lead to the unification of forces as stipulated in the R-ARCSS.